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NO PREEMPTION OF LABOR LAW BY FEDERAL MARITIME LAW
Federal Maritime Law does not preempt plaintiff's claim under New York
Labor Law§§ 200, 240(1) and§ 241(6) establishing general duty to protect
health and safety of employees, and requiring reasonable and adequate safety
protections for construction, evacuation and demolition work.

Cammon v. City of New York, et. al.
95 N. Y.2d 583
(Decided December 21, 2000)
Plaintiff Willie Cammon, a foreman dock builder, was injured while repairing
a wood fender system at the South Bronx Transfer Station, also known as the Hunts
Point Sanitation Department Transfer Station. The injury occurred while plaintiff was
working from a float stage in navigable waters that was secured to the land based
transfer station. Specifically, plaintiff was cutting timber from the bulkhead. While
working on the timber a passing tugboat created turbulence that moved the crane bar
and float stage. The timber came loose and subsequently struck, plaintiffs head and
body.
New York City ("the City") owns and operates the Marine Transfer Station
and contracted with defendant, general contractor, Anjac Enterprises, Inc. ("Anjac")
to repair stmctures at the facility. Anjac subcontracted the pier-repair to third-party
defendant Macro Enterprises, LTD., ("Macro") plaintiffs employer. Macro agreed
"to perform all work . . . strictly in conformance and compliance with all laws, rules,
regulations, ordinances and statutes in force in the locality in which the work is
located. As a construction worker "engaged in maritime employment" (33 U.S.C.A.
§ 902(3)) plaintiff qualified and received compensation and medical benefits under
the Longshore and H arbor Worker's Compensation Act ("LHWCA") (33 U.S.C.A. §
90 I et seq).
Plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, alleging violations of State
Labor Law § § 200, 240(1) and 241 (6) against the City and Anjac. Anjac asserted a
third-party complaint against plaintiffs employer Macro, seeking contribution and
indemnification.
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The City and Anjac moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint
upon the ground that federal maritime law preempts New York Labor Law. In the
alternative, defendants moved for summary judgment on their contractual and
common law indemnification claims against third-party defendant Macro. Plaintiff
cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law § 240( I )
and § 241 (6) claims. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment to the extent of dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiffs cross
motion.
The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding that
federal maritime law did not preempt plaintiff 's Labor Law causes of action. The
Appellate Division subsequently granted the defendants and third-party defendant
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certified the following question: "[ w ] as
the order of this Court, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, properly
made?'' The Court of appeals, Smith, J. held that, under the circumstances presented
,

plaintiffs Labor Law claims are not preempted. Affirmed.
Defendants and third party defendants maintain that federal maritime law
should apply to the exclusion of plaintiff's claims. Maritime law does not generally
impose liability without actual proof of negligence. Alternatively, New York Labor
Law § 240( I), however, imposes strict liability upon an owner or contractor. Zimmer
v. Chemung Cowzty Pe1jorming Arts, 65 N. Y.2d 513(1985).

Thus, plaintiff would

have to show actual negligence on the part of the defendants. In support of their
contention, that to impose state liability standards where admiralty jurisdiction exists
would disrupt the uniformity of federal maritime law, defendants rely on the First
Department case, Tibak v. City of New York, 546 N. Y. S.2d 602 (!51 Dept. 1 985). "In
that case (unlike this case), the First Department determined that plaintiffs Labor
Law claims were superseded by federal admiralty law, and held that "the rights and
liabilities of the parties under the general maritime law cannot be enlarged or
impaired by state statute.l.Q_, at 602. Defendants also argue that the Second
Department has similarly held with respect to Labor Law § 240 in Erikson v. Long Is.
Light. Co. , 653 N.Y. S.2d 670 (2d Dept. 1997) and Rigopoulos v. State ofNew York,

653 N.Y. S.2d 667 (2d Dept. 1997).
Plaintiff argues that federal maritime law does not preempt his Labor Law
claims because there is no federal law or interest directly impacted by its
implementation. Consequently, plaintiff contends, uniformity of maritime law would
not be affected by allowing State law claims in this case. Paramount to plaintiffs
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argument is the interest that New York has in regulating safe construction practices
within its borders and there is a presumption against restricting exercise of its police
powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens.
Judge Smith clarifies, that the fact that federal maritime law is involved does
not necessarily mean that State law is superseded. Although, it remains unclear the
extent to which State courts may apply their substantive law to maritime cases, there
are a number of factors to consider including: whether the State rule conflicts with
federal law; hinders uniformity; makes substantive changes; or interferes with the
characteristic features of maritime law or commerce.
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the applicability of procedural
state law in maritime actions. In Western Fuel Co.

v.

Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921),

the Court held that a widow of a maritime worker killed i n California territorial waters
could bring a wrongful death action in admiralty. The Court reasoned: "[t]he subject
matter is maritime and local in character and the ...supplement to the rule applied in
maritime courts . ..will not work material prejudice to the characteristics of general
maritime law."
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court again applied the so called "maritime
but local" rule where a carpenter's injury occurred on navigable waters. Grant Smith
Porter Ship Co.

v.

Rohde. 257 U.S. 469 (1922).

The Court concluded that State

compensation law should apply, stating that "as to certain local matters regulation of
which would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of the
latter might be mod i fied or supplemented with state statues." Jd. at 477.
The Court in th is case reasoned, given the fact that plaintiffs theory of
liability arose under New York Labor Law, that the protection of workers engaged in
maritime activities is a concern of federal maritime law. Consequently, this case is
unlikely to disrupt general maritime law principles by the application of a state law
liability statute. "State application of strict liability here will not unduly interfere with
the federal interest in maintaining the free flow of maritime commerce."
New York's Labor Law is a local statute enacted to protect the health and
safety of workers. Thus, an important local concern is at issue in the resolution of this
issue of preemption. Application of the doctrine of "maritime but local" establishes
that under these circumstances where the tort was maritime but local and there are no
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far-reaching implications that may undermine general maritime principles, New York
Labor Law is applicable even though it applies strict liability.
The lengthy dissent by Judge Rosenblatt, joined by Judge Levine, argued that
maritime law preempts Labor Law § 240( I ), therefore dissenting in part. The
dissenters point out that the construction work and the cause of the injury (passing
tug) have a substantial connection to maritime activity. The thrust of the dissent
hinges on the proposition that there is an irreconcilable conflict between Labor Law §
240( I ) and maritime law. That "under Labor Law § 240( I ), an injured workers
contributory negligence does not reduce a defendant's liability, but under maritime
law it does. Thus, this conflict, the dissent argues, has direct implications on the
administration of maritime law and recovery under maritime law.
George Schwab IV
Class of 2003
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